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Abstract—We investigate the role of permanent and transitory shocks for
firms and aggregate dynamics. We find that permanent shocks to produc-
tivity and permanent shifts in the composition of output explain at least
four-fifths of firms’ dynamics. However, these permanent shocks are
almost uncorrelated across firms and are therefore less relevant for
aggregate dynamics. Transitory shocks, on the other hand, are not very
important at the firm level, but they account for most of the volatility of
aggregate hours and output, because they are significantly correlated
across firms. Finally, we try to make some progress on the interpretation
of the shocks.
I. Introduction
WE investigate the nature of firms and aggregateshocks. Empirical macroeconomic research has
mainly approached this question using aggregate time se-
ries. Yet, the conditions that guarantee the existence of a
meaningful aggregate production function are unlikely to be
satisfied in practice. As a result, shocks identified directly
from aggregate data are, at best, hard to interpret. We tackle
this problem by directly modeling the dynamics of a panel
of large, publicly traded companies.
We assume that firm dynamics are driven by three dif-
ferent shocks. First, there are permanent, stochastic techno-
logical improvements. Second, there are permanent changes
in the composition of aggregate output, and in consumers’
tastes, that translate into changes in the relative demands for
the different firms. Finally, there are transitory shocks. We
identify the three shocks with long-run restrictions in a
structural VAR: we impose that transitory shocks do not
have permanent effects on productivity and market share,
and that composition shocks do not have a permanent effect
on productivity.
For each firm, we recover the three time series of struc-
tural shocks. We then investigate the relative importance of
each shock for firms and aggregate dynamics. We find that
permanent technology shocks and permanent changes in the
composition of output explain more than four-fifths of firm
dynamics. However, we also find that these shocks are
almost uncorrelated across firms. By contrast, the correla-
tion of transitory shocks lies between 20.5% and 26.8%,
depending on the specifics of the model we use. In other
words, we show the existence of an aggregate transitory
shock. This shock explains most of the variations in output
and labor input for the U.S. economy, despite being the least
important shock at the firm level.
There have been many previous attempts to identify the
exogenous sources of the business cycle. One strand of
literature follows the lead of Kydland and Prescott (1982)
by specifying a dynamic equilibrium model, choosing the
primitive source(s) of the fluctuation and defining
shock(s) as residual(s)1 from the equations of the model.
Recent papers on this topic (Smets & Wouters, 2003;
Chari, Kehoe, & McGrattan, 2004a) have found that shocks
to the consumption-leisure margin explain a large fraction
of the fluctuations.2 Another strand of literature has adopted
the long-run identification strategy of Blanchard and Quah
(1989), and Shapiro and Watson (1988). Gali (1999) uses a
bivariate VAR with the growth rate of labor productivity and
hours worked, and distinguishes shocks that affect labor
productivity in the long run from those that do not. The
main findings of this approach are that the permanent shock
has a negative short-run effect on hours, and that it explains
very little of the business cycle.3 Some recent studies have
used industry data to investigate the robustness of the first
finding (Francis, 2001; Chang & Hong, 2003). Gali and
Rabanal (2004) give a comprehensive survey of the existing
literature, while Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) and
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2004b) present a critique.
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1 For instance Prescott (1986) arrives at an estimate of the fraction of
output variability that can be attributed to technology shocks using actual
Solow residuals to estimate the variance and serial correlation of the
underlying technology shocks. Feeding shocks with these properties into
a calibrated real-business-cycle model resulted in output variability that
was between 50% and 75% of actual variability.
2 Hall (1997) emphasizes that a large fraction of business cycle fluctu-
ations seems to be accounted for by changes in the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrat-
tan (2004a) label this variable “labor wedge.” Smets and Wouters (2003)
study a dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and
allow for various types of shocks, including productivity shocks, prefer-
ence shocks, and markup shocks. They find that a sizable fraction of
output volatility is due to preference shocks that induce changes on the
consumption-leisure margin.
3 The negative effect of technology on hours has been disputed by
several authors. See for instance Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
(2004).
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We make three contributions to the literature. First, we
compare the relative importance of permanent and transi-
tory shocks for micro- and macrodynamics. Kiley (1998)
performed a similar exercise using industry data for the
manufacturing sector, but we are the first to investigate the
comovements of permanent and transitory shocks at the firm
level. Second, we introduce the composition shocks and
show that they are important sources of firm-level dynam-
ics. Third, we investigate whether aggregation poses prob-
lems for the identification of permanent shocks, and we
make some progress in the interpretation of shocks. We find
that monetary shocks only induce transitory dynamics. Tax
shocks appear to have negative transitory effects. We also
find some evidence suggesting that tax shocks have negative
permanent effects.
In section II, we present a simple, neoclassical model of
an economy with sectorial shocks, which we use to derive
our identifying restrictions. In section III we describe our
data. In section IV we present our empirical strategy, and
our findings. In section V we perform some robustness
checks and in section VI we try to give an economic
interpretation to the identified shocks.
II. The Model
The purpose of the model is to derive the structural
restrictions that will allow us to identify the different shocks
that affect the economy. Since these restrictions apply to the
long-run effect of certain shocks, we emphasize only the
long-run properties of the model. Here we present a simple
case with no capital and fixed labor supply. The general case
is presented in the appendix. Throughout the discussion,






subject to the budget constraint
c t  b t   t  w tn t  1  r tb t	1.
Consumers receive real labor income w tn t, where w t is the
real wage and n t the amount of labor supplied, the aggregate
profits of the firms  t, and the interest payments rt on their
real bond holdings b t. The real bond is in 0 net supply. The
consumption good is obtained by aggregating the outputs of
a continuum of firms:















The only nonstandard feature of this model is the presence
of idiosyncratic taste parameters it that evolve stochasti-
cally:
c̃it  it  cit.
The consumption of cit physical units of good i delivers the
same utility as the consumption of itcit /jt units of good j.
The shocks it are exogenous4 and they are assumed to





 is a constant drift, i
(L) is a square summable
polynomial in the lag operator L, and it
 is a white noise.


















We assume that the goods markets operate under perfect
competition, that labor is the only factor of production, and
that returns to scale are constant.5
yit  zitnit,
where yit denotes output and nit the labor input of firm i. The
technology of each firm zit is also assumed to follow a
process zit  zit	1 exp(i
z  i
z(L)it
z ) where i
z is a constant
drift, i
z(L) is a square summable polynomial in the lag
operator L, and it
z is a white noise. Perfect competition
implies that real profits are 0 and pit /p t  w t /zit. Nominal
income identity
pitp t citdi  w tn t,
together with our definition of p , implies that
w tn t  c t,
which we can use to derive
cit  it






the labor market equilibrium




4 We use the normalization 0
1 wit

	1 di  1. The shocks are conveniently
normalized to make p a price level (that is, if all prices are the same, they
are also equal to the price level). The normalization is such that idiosyn-
cratic shocks do not directly affect aggregate outcomes. Suppose that you
compare two economies with different distributions of wit. Also suppose
that all industries have the same productivity and that the two distributions
satisfy the normalization condition. Then the two economies will have
identical aggregate outcomes (same capital stock, same labor supply, same
interest rate).
5 See appendix for the case with capital accumulation and endogenous
labor supply.
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and
c t  z tn t,







where zt is the utility-based measure of aggregate produc-
tivity. We emphasize that this utility-based measure is not
the one that is constructed in the national income and
product accounts. Note that z is unambiguously defined in
our setup, even though, of course, the units of  and z are
arbitrary.6 We see that z depends on the preference shocks.
To understand this dependence better, fix the units, and
differentiate with respect to i:
z t

	2  dzt  itzit
	1ditit .
Thus, changes in preferences have a positive impact of total
factor productivity (TFP) when  grows more for goods
with a higher initial value of z. Note that, in this experi-
ment, there is no change in technology in any industry. For
lack of a better name, we refer to these changes in prefer-









By definition the only shock that affects productivity of firm
i in the long run is zit, but the share of firms i in total output


















Finally, we assume that there is a transitory shock it
T. This
shock has no permanent effect on the productivity or the
























In this section, we describe our sample, and we discuss
the representativeness and statistical properties of our data.
Our sample includes the 526 firms in COMPUSTAT that
have nonmissing data for sales and number of employees
from 1970 to 2002, and that did not experience a large
merger.7 Our baseline specification includes three variables:
labor productivity, relative size, and labor input. An impor-
tant issue in our analysis is the choice of a productivity
measure. We must trade off theoretical motivations against
measurement problems. Conceptually, TFP would be the
best measure. However, measuring the effective flow of
services from the capital stock is extremely challenging. On
the other hand, labor productivity (YH) is well measured,
especially in the long run, but it can be affected by non-
technological shocks. For instance, Uhlig (2004) points out
that permanent changes in taxes on capital income can
affect long-run labor productivity.8
For the labor input we use the log of the number of
employees
nit  log employees.
We use sales instead of gross output for lack of data on
intermediate inputs and inventories.9 We do not have price
data at the firm level. We must therefore use sector output
deflators, which we take from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000),
and which we extend to 2002. For firm i in sector I with
deflator pIt, we define labor productivity as
zit  log salesitpIt   nit.
Finally, we define relative size (or market share) as10
6 Suppose  is the preference for a kilogram of chocolate, and z is the
number of kilograms produced per hour of work. Now, change the units to
grams. This corresponds to multiplying z by 1,000 and dividing  by
1,000. This does not change anything real in our economy: it changes
neither c nor z. The same applies to comparisons across industries: the
levels of zi are arbitrary and cannot be compared, while the products wizi
are directly comparable.
7 A large merger is a merger that increases the assets of the company by
more than 50%.
8 See Gali and Rabanal (2004) for a discussion.
9 We have data on finished goods inventories for 153 firms. We have
constructed an alternative data set in which we subtract the change in
inventories in finished goods from sales before deflating to obtain a more
precise measure of value added. The results are virtually identical.
10 We have performed the analysis using both real weights and nominal
weights. The results are very similar.
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mit 
salesiti  1526 salesit.
We now assess the representativeness of our sample by
constructing two synthetic data sets. We first aggregate up to
the sector level, for which we have price deflators, and we
compare our synthetic data series to the ones in Jorgenson
and Stiroh (2000). We have 32 sectors, roughly at the
two-digit SIC level, including 21 manufacturing industries.
The number of firms per sector varies from one to one
hundred. To have a sense of the representativeness of our
data, we regress the growth rate of n, m, and z of each sector
onto the synthetic growth rate we have obtained from the
firms. The R2 of the regressions varies from 0.01 to 0.83.11
We also compare the completely aggregated data, and we
find that our sample is representative of the whole economy,
for both employment and labor productivity, as shown in
figure 1. The Jorgenson data set is used only for the
comparison in figure 1 and for the deflators, otherwise
sectorial and aggregate data are aggregated from the firm-
level data set.
To determine the correct stationary transformation of the
variables we run a battery of tests. We perform an advanced
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test for each series to assess
the presence of a stochastic trend in the series. The results
for the firm data set are summarized in table 1. For example,
in the case of the logarithm of labor productivity, we were
able to reject the null of a unit root at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
confidence levels for respectively 47, 38, and 8 firms. The
ADF test on the first difference of the same series rejected
the null of the unit root at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence
levels for 499, 489, and 414 firms, respectively. Similarly,
performing a Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS)
test, we were not able to reject the null of stationarity for the
same series at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels for
132, 69, and 50 firms, respectively. The KPSS test on the
first difference did not reject the null of stationarity at the
10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels for respectively 517,
488, and 467 firms. We perform the same analysis on both
the relative weight measure mi and the labor input ni. A
summary of the results suggests that for the large majority
of firms both series are again I(1).
11 The R2 for z  [0.01, 0.62], for m  [0.03, 0.83], and for n  [0.01,
0.74]. In the case of n the lowest R2 is for the sector labeled “Textile mill
products” for which we have two firms, while the highest R2 is for the
sector labeled “Machinery nonelectrical” for which we have 37 firms. The
firm data from COMPUSTAT and the Jorgenson-Stiroh sectorial data set
are derived from different source data/surveys; they have different defi-
nitions (for example, number of workers at a firm level; a quality-adjusted
index of labor input at an industry level).
FIGURE 1.—AGGREGATE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE FIRM-LEVEL DATA SET
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Output from Aggregating Sectors











Labor from Aggregating Firms
Hours from Aggregating Sectors












Labor Productivity from Aggregating Firms
Labor Productivity from Aggregating Sectors
Notes: Sector-level data are from the Jorgenson data set. Firm-level data are from COMPUSTAT.
TABLE 1.—UNIT ROOT TESTS
z z n n m m
CV
ADF
1% 8 414 12 285 14 351
5% 38 489 39 408 35 442
10% 47 499 58 450 55 484
KPSS
1% 50 467 24 397 19 424
5% 69 488 34 448 41 466
10% 132 517 84 507 102 506
Notes: Number of firms for which the null hypothesis of a unit root could be rejected using the ADF
test and the null of stationarity could not be rejected using the KPSS test. The Total number of firms is
526. All the series are entered in logarithms and  indicates the first-difference operator. z is labor
productivity, m is the relative weight, and n is the number of hours.
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IV. Results
Our baseline specification is the trivariate VAR with two
lags estimated for each firm or sector i.12 To remain consis-
tent with the outcome of the previous tests, we specify the
VAR in first differences. The joint behavior of the three
variables is described by the following MA representation
where the variables are expressed in natural logarithms:
 zitmit
nit








T are structural shocks, which are assumed
to be mutually orthogonal and serially uncorrelated with vari-
ance normalized to unity.13 The MA is recovered estimating a
VAR and using the long-run restrictions derived in the stylized
model of the previous section: the composition shock it
 has no
long-run effect on the productivity which restricts ci12(1) to be
0 and the transitory shock it
T has no long-run effect on both the
productivity and the relative weight of the firms which restricts
ci13(1) and ci23(1) to be both equal to 0.14
A. Impulse Responses
We discuss the results obtained with the firm data set,
only highlighting the results for the sector data set if they
differ. In our specification the three variables have a sto-
chastic trend, therefore no shock has a transitory effect on
the level of a variable unless we imposed it.
Figure 2 shows the estimated effects of a positive permanent
technology shock it
z . The left part of the figure displays the
mean impulse response of the level of the three variables to a
1-standard-deviation shock. The right part shows the corre-
sponding distribution of impact responses for the firms. The
mean of the point estimates suggests that a positive technology
shock increases both productivity and the relative weight but
decreases hours. The decline in hours is consistent with the
evidence from aggregate and industry data reviewed in Gali
and Rabanal (2004). The distribution of responses shows that
the impact effect on productivity is positive for all firms. The
effect on the weight is positive on impact for 79% of the firms.
Firms that experience a positive productivity shock gain mar-
ket shares. The effect on hours is negative on impact for 81%
of the firms.
Similarly, figure 3 shows the estimated effects of a positive
composition shock it
. The empirical effect on labor produc-
tivity of the composition shock is equally distributed around 0
as one can observe from the impact distribution in figure 3. The
effects on the weight are positive for all the firms. The effects
on hours are positive for virtually all firms.
Finally, figure 4 shows the estimated effects of a positive
transitory shock it
T. The mean effect on productivity is
again not different from 0 (the negative blip on impact is
12 The results estimating the VAR with one and three lags are similar.
13 Both the orthogonality and normalization of the structural shocks are
part of the identifying assumptions. The normalization assumption just
redefines the unit of each shock. The orthogonality assumption is justified
on the basis that we are identifying fundamental shocks. We define
positive productivity shock as a shock that raises productivity in the long
run, and positive composition shock as a shock that raises the relative
weight in the long run.
14 We are implicitely assuming that the MA is fundamental; see Lippi
and Reichlin (1993) for a discussion of this assumption.
FIGURE 2.—FIRM DYMANICS DUE TO THE TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
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Notes: The first column shows the average of the firms’ impulse response. The second column shows the distribution of impact responses. Firm data set, data source: COMPUSTAT.
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mainly due to an outlier). Using the sector data set the
impact effect of the transitory shocks on productivity is still
0 but becomes positive for 68% of the sectors in the second
and third periods.15 The impact effect on the weight is also
positive for roughly half of the firms, which shows that the
short-run effect is also small. The impact on the level of
hours is positive for all firms.
B. Variance Decompositions
Firm and Industry Dynamics. Figure 5 shows the mean
of the variance decomposition for the variables in level of
each N estimated VAR. From the figure it appears that
productivity movements at the firm level are on average
mostly explained by technology shocks. On impact approx-
imately 80% of productivity movements are caused by
technology shocks, while composition shocks and transitory
shocks explain 12% and 8%, respectively. Relative weight
movements are dominated by composition (on average 62%
of impact movements and 70% of long-run movements) and
technology shocks (roughly 30% at all frequencies). Labor
input movements are also dominated by composition (on
average 53% on impact and 55% in the long run) and
technology shocks (on average 34%). Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, we find that the transitory shock is not so important
for firm dynamics. We present the results obtained using the
synthetic sectorial data set.
Figure 6 shows that the mean variance decomposition
across the sectors of the different shocks are similar for the
technology and composition shocks, while the transitory
shock explains around 33% of the labor input variance. As
we shall see below, this last observation reflects the fact that
sectors are aggregate units.
Aggregate Dynamics. We now turn to the principal
motivation of the paper and investigate the comovement of
the three shocks across firms. For each shock, we compute
all pairwise correlations with the same shock of all other
firms. This gives us three symmetric N  N matrices of
correlations. We then take the average16 for each firm and
end up with N mean correlations.17 Table 2 shows that for
our baseline specification the average of the mean correla-
tions is around 2.8% for the technology shock, 1.59% for
the preference shock, and 20.4% for the transitory shock.
Table 2 shows that the sectorial technology shocks have
their average correlation that increases up to 4.7%. This is
still much lower than an average of 24% for the transitory
shock.
15 This is consistent with the observation that labor productivity and
hours are positively correlated at the sector level, but not at the firm level.
In the synthetic aggregate firm-level data set, the correlation between the
growth rate of labor productivity and the growth rate of workers is positive
and equal to 0.17 (in the Jorgenson data set the correlation between the
growth rate of aggregate labor productivity and the growth rate of
aggregate labor input is 0.13 [it is 0.45 using TFP]). At the firm level, the
average correlation between labor productivity and labor input is 	0.13
(in the Jorgenson data set the average industry correlation between labor
productivity and labor input is 	0.18). This apparent paradox between
aggregate productivity being procyclical and disaggregated productivity
being countercyclical is clearly interesting, but we feel it has no room in
this paper. Moreover, the correlations are small, which indicates that
productivity is probably mainly acyclical.
16 In taking the averages we exclude the 1 on the main diagonal of the
correlation matrix.
17 Using the median instead of the mean gives similar results.
FIGURE 3.—FIRM DYNAMICS DUE TO THE COMPOSITION SHOCK






Mean Response to Composition Shock
years
productivity






















Distribution of Impact Effects











Notes: The first column shows the average of the firms’ impulse response. The second column shows the distribution of impact responses. Firm data set, data source: COMPUSTAT.
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j )/N for j  z, , T, in order to visualize the
implications of the correlations for an aggregate shock. One
has to keep in mind that these are structural shocks whose
variance is normalized to 1, and that firms have different
weights, so that the average shock of figure 7 has no
meaning beyond making explicit the different levels of
correlation between the shocks. The transitory shock ap-
pears to be a good candidate to explain aggregate short-run
fluctuations, which are characterized by a high degree of
comovement across firms. Indeed the average of the transi-
tory shock appears to experience more important fluctua-
tions than the technology shock. On the contrary, permanent
technology and composition shocks appear to be mostly
idiosyncratic. Interestingly, figure 7 shows that the aggre-
gate technology shock exhibits a sustained negative period
FIGURE 4.—FIRM DYNAMICS DUE TO THE TRANSITORY SHOCK
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Notes: The first column shows the average of the firms’ impulse response. The second column shows the distribution of impact responses. Firm data set, data source: COMPUSTAT.
FIGURE 5.—FIRM DYNAMICS, VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION

















































Notes: Each panel shows the mean of the variance decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated VAR. The first panel shows the percentage of the variance of z, m, and n explained on average
by the technology shock while the second and the third respectively for the composition and the transitory shock. Firm data set. Data source: COMPUSTAT.
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during the mid-1970s and the beginning of 1980s,18 and a
sustained positive period in the 1990s.
From the average variance decomposition we conclude
that the transitory shock is the least important shock at the
firm level. However, contrary to the technology and com-
position shocks, the transitory shock appears to hit many
firms contemporaneously. This property implies that at the
aggregate level the transitory shock is able to explain most
of the short-run fluctuations of the economy. To illustrate
this, we use the estimated VARs to simulate a series for each
firm shutting down the technology and composition shocks.
The exact procedure is discussed in the appendix. Figure 8
shows the actual aggregate output and hours series together
with the simulated series. The transitory shock explains a
large proportion of the fluctuations of both aggregate output
and hours.
Figure 9 shows the simulated employment and output
implied by the technology shock. To compute an exact
variance decomposition of aggregate hours and output is
impossible. This is because transitory shocks of firms are
typically correlated with technology and/or composition
shocks of other firms. We would have to make an assump-
tion on causality (a technology shock in firms j increases
demand and therefore causes a positive transitory shock in
firms j or vice versa) to be able to order the shocks. The
correlation across firms of different shocks is a topic for
future research.
V. Discussion
We now discuss the robustness of the results.
A. The Lack of Firm-Level Price Deflators
We do not have price data at the firm level. The impli-
cation is that our approach might mix up technology shocks
and composition shocks at the firm level.19 To see this,







This shows that one cannot disentangle  from z by looking
only at relative sizes. However, this issue does not prevent
18 This is consistent with the productivity slowdown experienced by the
U.S. economy.
19 Klette and Griliches (1996) explore the inconsistency of common
scale estimators when output is proxied by deflated sales, based on a
common output deflator across firms.

















































Notes: Each panel shows the mean of the variance decomposition for the variables in level of each N estimated VAR. The first panel shows the percentage of the variance of z, m, and n explained on average
by the technology shock while the second and the third respectively for the composition and the transitory shock. SEC synthetic data set. Data source: COMPUSTAT.
TABLE 2.—MEAN CORRELATIONS OF THE THREE IDENTIFIED SHOCKS







Firm data 0.0281 0.0159 0.2045
Sectoral data 0.0470 0.0156 0.2400
Firm data with bi-VAR 0.0245 - 0.0473
Firm data controlling for
inventories 0.0481 0.0294 0.2686
Notes: For each specification we report the average of the mean correlations of the three identified
shocks across firms/sectors. Firm: shocks identified using the firm-level data set. Sec: shocks identified
using the synthetic sectoral level. Firm bi-VAR: shocks identified from firm-level data using a bi-VAR.
Finally, firm with inventories: shocks identified using the subset of firms for which inventory data are
available.
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us from identifying the transitory shocks. Consider our
tri-VAR
xt  ALxt  Gt,
where




with the structural shocks such that Ett  I, and GG 
V the covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovations.
Our main long-run restriction is that the transitory shock
affects neither the weight nor the productivity in the long
run, in other words
R  I  A1	1G.
Many 3  3 matrices R satisfy these restrictions, but they all
have the same third column. This pins down the third
column of G, and therefore the impulse response to the
transitory shock, irrespective of how mixed up the first two
shocks are. So we may not be able to say whether techno-
logical improvements or permanent changes in relative
FIGURE 7.—AVERAGE OF FIRM-LEVEL SHOCKS
Notes: The figure shows the average of the three shocks in order to visualize the implications of the correlations for an aggregate shock. Data source: COMPUSTAT.
FIGURE 8.—AGGREGATE DYNAMICS, TRANSITORY SHOCK






























Notes: Aggregate simulated growth rate of employment and output implied by the transitory shock versus the actual series. Data source: COMPUSTAT.
FIRMS AND AGGREGATE DYNAMICS 595
demands drive most of the firm dynamics, but we can still
learn about the role of transitory shocks at the firm level and
in the aggregate.
Given that we cannot always disentangle the two perma-
nent shocks, one would be tempted to run a simpler bi-VAR
model with only one transitory and one permanent shock.
However, in the presence of two permanent shocks, we
generally need a tri-VAR in order to correctly identify the
transitory shock. Blanchard and Quah (1989) give necessary
and sufficient conditions for a bivariate representation not to
produce misleading results when the number of shocks is
greater than two.20 In words, we would correctly identify the
transitory shock only if the distributed lag effects in pro-
ductivity and relative size are sufficiently similar across the
technology and composition shocks. Interestingly, if we run
bi-VAR in our data set using labor productivity and hours or
relative weights and hours, the identified transitory shock
becomes much less correlated across firms. The third line of
table 2 reports that in this case the correlation across firms
of the permanent shock is on average 0.0245 and the
correlation across firms of the transitory shock is only
0.0473.
B. Aggregation
We now compare the shocks identified in our firm-
VARs with the shocks one would identify if one were to
run VARs on more aggregated data. Table 3A compares
the shocks identified from synthetic sector data to the
average of the shocks identified at the firm level. For each
sector, we compute the average of the shocks hitting the
firms in that sector, weighted by sales to take into account
the relative importance of the different firms in the sector.
We then regress each sector-level shock on the three firm
averages. Table 3A shows that there is no systematic
aggregation bias. The second column shows that perma-
nent composition shocks from the sector-level data are
significantly related to both permanent average technol-
ogy and composition shocks at the firm level. However
the coefficient on the permanent technology shock is
much smaller than the coefficient on the permanent
composition shock and much less significant. Here the
bias is statistically significant but small and probably not
relevant economically. Table 3B presents similar results
at the aggregate level. In this case, we run a bi-VAR on
aggregate synthetic data, and we compare the identified
shocks to the average of the shocks identified at the firm
level. Note that the shocks are normalized to have a
variance of 1. Thus, the average of the shocks, on the
right-hand side, has a variance less than 1. So we would
expect the coefficients for the regression of a shock on its
own average to be more than 1, as is the case in table 3.
Note, however, that the typical national income and
product account (NIPA) measure of productivity growth
would not pick up the effect of the composition shocks.21







 dcitci  dit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  pici /(pc), which is the nominal share, which
we have called mi. Thus,
20 Blanchard and Quah (1989, p. 670). 21 We thank our referee for pointing this out.
FIGURE 9.—AGGREGATE DYNAMICS, TECHNOLOGY SHOCK
Notes: Aggregate simulated growth rate of hours and output implied by the technology shock versus the actual series. Data source: COMPUSTAT.














The first term is the NIPA measure of aggregate consump-
tion growth, and it corresponds to the weighting scheme that
we adopt to construct our synthetic data. In both cases, the
contribution of composition shocks to aggregate productiv-
ity growth is missed. The fact that we do not find aggrega-
tion biases is of some interest regardless what our model
predicts. CRS and perfect competition rule out most of the
aggregation effects by assumption, while the empirical find-
ing of no aggregation biases constitutes a green flag for the
use of aggregate data by macroeconomists.
VI. Robustness
We have estimated different models to test the quality of
the VAR estimates. We have found that using real weights
instead of nominal weights gives similar results. We also
have performed the analysis on a subset of firms for which
data on finished good inventories are available and found
again very similar results. In table 2 we report the average
correlations of the firm shocks for this last case.
Another issue concerns the small sample properties of our
estimates: How well can we identify the shocks and how
well are our impulse responses and variance decompositions
estimated given the limited data we have? The small sample
problems of structural VARs that achieve identification
through long-run restrictions have been emphasized by
Faust and Leeper (1997) and Erceg et al. (2005). To answer
these important questions, we generate Monte Carlo simu-
lations using a panel of artificial data22 to test the quality of
the VAR estimates of impulse responses and variance de-
composition. A discussion of the results would take us too
far from the focus of the paper. In short we found that, even
if the number of observations in the time dimension is
relatively small, the relatively large cross section enables us
to recover remarkably well the structural shocks and rather
well the average impulse responses and average variance
decompositions. In the case of the variance decompositions
the confidence intervals are large, but we nevertheless are
always able to rank the relative importance of the three
shocks.
VII. Interpretation of the Shocks
Thus far, we have restrained from interpreting the differ-
ent shocks. We now try to make some progress on this issue
by regressing the firm shocks on well-known, identified
macroshocks: the Romer-Romer monetary shocks, the
Hamilton oil price shocks, and fiscal shocks, using cycli-
cally adjusted data from the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), which should capture true changes in fiscal policy,
as opposed to automatic feedbacks from shocks to GDP. The
macroshocks are common across firms, so we really only
have as many observations as number of years. We therefore
cluster our residuals by years to obtain robust standard
errors.
Table 4 shows the results of firm-level regressions. The
table is divided into two panels. In the first column of each
panel, we regress the firm shocks on contemporaneous and
lagged values of all our macro shocks. We next eliminate
the jointly statistically insignificant macroshocks using a
joint F-test until we stay with only significant regressors.
The second column of each panel presents the final speci-
fication.
Lagged oil shocks are always very significant: an increase
in the oil price has negative transitory and permanent
negative consequences. Monetary shocks do not have a
permanent effect, but a transitory one: a contractionary
monetary policy induces a negative transitory shock. Next,
we find that taxes have positive and negative transitory
effects, as expected. We also find that taxes tend to have
negative permanent effects. That taxes decrease long-run
labor productivity can easily be explained if taxes reduce
returns on capital, and therefore investment. These results
show that permanent productivity shocks need not come
from exogenous changes in technology. This seems a natu-
ral topic for future research.
We believe that this exercise confirms the validity of our
approach. The shocks that theory tells us should not affect22 The data-generating process for each firm is an MA.
TABLE 3A.—COMPARISON OF SECTOR-LEVEL SHOCKS WITH SHOCKS
IDENTIFIED FROM FIRM-LEVEL DATA
Dependent variable is shock identified
from synthetic sector data
Technology Composition Transitory
Weighted average of firm 1.206 0.095 	0.065
technology shocks 0.038 0.037 0.039
Weighted average of firm 	0.028 1.203 0.007
composition shocks 0.037 0.035 0.038
Weighted average of firm 0.037 	0.012 0.988
transitory shocks 0.032 0.031 0.033
N 900 900 900
Note: Regressors are sector averages of firm shocks, weighted by sales. Standard errors are in italics
below the regression coefficients. Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 3B.—COMPARISON OF AGGREGATE SHOCKS WITH SHOCKS IDENTIFIED
FROM FIRM-LEVEL DATA




Weighted average of firm 2.891 0.281
technology shocks 0.752 0.466
Weighted average of firm 	1.023 0.434
composition shocks 0.83 0.515
Weighted average of firm 	0.221 2.012
transitory shocks 0.372 0.231
N 30 30
Note: Regressors are averages of firm shocks, weighted by sales. Standard errors are in italics below
the regression coefficients. Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
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long-run productivity, do not, and those that should, do. On
the other hand, we acknowledge that a good part of the
transitory component remains unexplained.
VIII. Conclusion
We have found that permanent productivity shocks and
permanent changes in the composition of output explain at
least four-fifths of firm-level dynamics. However, these
shocks are essentially uncorrelated across firms, and there-
fore explain little of aggregate fluctuations. On the other
hand, shocks that are transitory but correlated across firms
are responsible for the bulk of aggregate volatility. We have
shown that transitory shocks are significantly related to
monetary policy, while permanent shocks are not. We have
found that oil shocks have both permanent and transitory
effects. Finally, taxes seem to have negative long-run ef-
fects.
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Appendix A
Long-Run Restrictions with a General Production Function
We now consider general production functions with constant returns to
scale, and a standard labor supply function. Aggregate output is used for
consumption and investment








Value added of firms i is given by
yi  fiki,ni.
TABLE 4.—EXPLAINING FIRM-LEVEL SHOCKS
Technology Shock Transitory Shock
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Hamilton oil shock 	0.538 2.033
0.442 0.855
Hamilton (lagged) 1.628 1.367 7.74 4.973
0.447 0.607 1.026 1.85
Hamilton (lagged twice) 	1.255 	1.728 	2.541 	5.203
0.441 0.57 1.616 1.985
Romer-Romer shock 	0.033 	0.016
0.03 0.08
Romer-Romer (lagged) 	0.014 0.158 0.242
0.021 0.068 0.075
Romer-Romer (lagged twice) 	0.036 0.109
0.02 0.051









Growth rate of taxes,
cyclically adjusted
2.265 1.719 5.101 5.526
0.426 0.698 1.531 1.593





Notes: All regressions have the observations clustered by years. Government spending and taxes are
cyclically adjusted by the Congressional Budget Office. Standard errors are in italics below the regression
coefficients. Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
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Under constant returns to scale, the capital-labor ratio depends only on the













This in turn implies that in the long run, the only factors affecting labor
productivity are the technology of the firms, and
w
r   . In particular,
composition shocks wi do not affect labor productivity in the long run.
yi
ni
 fii wr   ,1  gin wr   .






And the price must be equal to the marginal cost23
pi
p
 ir  ,w,
where i (. , .), the firms’ marginal cost, is homogenous of degree 1. Using





  1 i
 
r  ,w.
National income identity (in real terms) is
y  wn  rk . (A1)
Product market equilibrium is
y  c  k . (A2)
Given our definition of the price level, we have that
 iir  ,w 
	1di  1, (A3)
and labor market equilibrium implies that




n wr  
di. (A4)
Finally, a labor supply function guaranteeing balanced growth is
n  wc  . (A5)
We have five equations in five aggregate unknowns (y, w, n , k, c).24
Identifying Restrictions
















Permanent shocks to  have no effect on TFP by construction, and no









Using TFP, our identification system should pick up technology and
composition shocks exactly. Using labor productivity, we would classify
as technological shocks that increase
w
r
, in particular shocks that change
the return on capital such as capital taxes or the depreciation rate. This




We construct a synthetic sectorial data set aggregating firm-level data
to a sectorial level (corresponding to the Jorgenson two-digit level, which
is also the level of disaggregation of our price deflators). Some of the
sectors are under-represented.
The firm-level data set appears to be representative of the aggregate
economy. We show the growth rate of aggregate nominal output (sales),
labor input, and labor productivity obtained from the firm-level data set
and compare it with the aggregate series obtained from the Jorgenson and
Stiroh (2000) sectorial data set. Aggregate nominal output is the sum of
nominal sales in firm and the sum of nominal gross output in Jorgenson
and Stiroh (2000). The aggregate labor input and labor productivity from
the Jorgenson data set are obtained through a weighted average of the
sectors’ growth rates, more precisely:
 ln x  
i
w i ln xi,w i 
1
2Pi,tQi,tPtQt  Pi,t	1Qi,t	1Pt	1Qt	1 ,
where w i is the Domar weight and x is the growth rate of the industry
variable. The aggregate labor productivity for the firm-level data is the
ratio of the sum of sales deflated by an aggregate index deflator obtained
23 Of course, in the Cobb-Douglas case where yi  zi ki
i ni





 r  i 











24 We could also use the equilibrium in the capital market




k wr  
,
where gi
k  wr    fi 1, 1i wr  	 . We know from Walras that it is
in fact redundant.
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by applying the above formula, to the sum of employees. We interpret this
as evidence that our firm sample is representative of the aggregate
economy.
Romer-Romer is the exogenous monetary policy shock calculated by
Christina Romer and David Romer (2004). The original series is monthly;
to obtain an annual series we sum the shocks in each year.
CBO fiscal variables are cyclically adjusted revenues and spending
published by CBO (available from the CBO Web site).
The Hamilton (1996) shock is defined as the amount by which the log
of oil prices ot in quarter t, pt, exceeds the maximum value over the
previous four quarters and 0 otherwise:
max0, ot  maxot	1, ot	2, ot	3, ot	4.
Appendix C
Simulations and Aggregation
Here we report how to obtain the aggregate series for output and hours
that are implied by the transitory shocks it
T of each firm. Small caps
indicate logarithm. By definition, aggregate hours are
n t  
i
nit,
which we can rewrite




Because we run the VAR in logs, we can simulate using the estimated
parameters and structural shock each  ln nit for all the firms. Of course
by construction each  ln nit is equal to the original one. We define  ln
n it as the series simulated shutting down the productivity and composition
shock. The simulated aggregate hours implied by the transitory shocks are
dñt  log 
i
i,t	1





. Following similar steps we simulate the aggregate
output implied by the transitory shocks:
d ỹt  log 
i
i,t	1
y  exp ln n it   ln z̃it,
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